waged by a plurality of capitalist and labour interests in the 'extra-economic sphere', on the other. 4 This pluralist-fractionalist tendency is characteristic of both structuralistfunctionalist Marxism and neo-Gramsican approaches, 5 but also, in Taylor's view, of Cammack's work since it 'operates at the level of surface appearances -depicting global capitalism as the pursuit of accumulation by the established interests who must concurrently secure hegemony within this process'. 6 In analytical terms, then, Cammack's new materialism is diagnosed as being congenitally blind to the reality that 'the subsumption of the World Bank into global capitalist social relations imparts a complex and contradictory character on the Bank'. By making the concept of relative autonomy the 'central concept' or 'cornerstone' of the new materialism, 7 Cammack is accused of 'an ahistorical form of argument' lacking in 'substantive explanatory power', which succeeds only in its attempt 'merely to invert the conclusions of mainstream social science'. In other words, the new materialism, whilst purporting to be derived from classical Marxism, is shown by Taylor to resemble a vulgarised Marxism in that it is not negative critique. 8 In Taylor imposes itself in seemingly objective fashion upon all social actors'; meaning that the 'pervasive irrationalities of the World Bank's institutional form, its development practices and its intellectual production must be comprehended not primarily as a result of a lack of "relative autonomy" from specific interests, but on the basis of the contradictions of global capitalist social relations within which the World Bank is subsumed '. 9 This paper acknowledges the irreconcilable theoretical tenets of Taylor's old and Cammack's new materialisms. The article does not seek to defend the new materialism on Cammack's behalf; rather it accepts Taylor's argument that the relative autonomy of regulative agencies involved in the management of capital accumulation can only ever be illusory. The reasons for this are explained in the first section of the paper. However, the shortcomings of open Marxism are then introduced in the following section. Chief among these is the allegation that, while the approach has been successful in asserting the negative dialectic of the form and content of class struggle during a difficult intellectual and world-historic period for 4 Jessop 2002, chapter 1. 5 Marxism generally, it has failed to move substantively beyond formality and abstraction by 'elaborating the actual historical struggles which have mediated and formulated the development of the contradictions of the capital relation'. 10 In particular, it has failed to acknowledge how class struggle can be mediated discursively. Having reviewed both approaches, the paper goes on to support a NMRP borne out of a synthesis of the insights of both approaches. The rationale for this lies in the conviction that Cammack's more 'applied' focus upon specific forms of contemporary class practice can aid open Marxism to move beyond general and abstract critique, thereby making an original and critical contribution to our understanding of the contemporary management of global capitalism. While the proposed NMRP refutes the problematic theorisation of relative autonomy in Cammack's original proposal, it is argued that a more rigorously theorised NMRP can extend negative critique to the current activities of international regulative agencies. By focusing on the activities of such agencies -beginning, as Cammack does, with their discursive operations -it is possible to discern how contemporary forms of ideology operate in a retroactive manner, obfuscating and distorting the contradictions being played out across the world market; and also how such agencies are seeking to exercise unprecedented levels of intervention and control in the management of individual national 'capitalisms', and under the rubric of promoting 'competitiveness'.
The critique of relative autonomy
In order to make sense of Taylor's outright rejection of Cammack's original proposal for a new materialism a brief detour into the debates on the Left in the 1970s and 1980s is necessary. A working indication of the general understanding of relative autonomy within structuralist-functionalist Marxism is given by Poulantzas in Political Power and Social Classes. He writes that '… the unity of power characteristic of the state, related to its role in the class struggle, is the reflection of its role of unity vis-à-vis the instances [economic, political, ideological and theoretical levels within a mode of production]; and its relative autonomy vis-à-vis the politically dominant classes or fractions is the reflection of the relative autonomy of the instances of a capitalist formation. In short, this unity and autonomy of the capitalist type of state is related to the specificity of its structures (relatively autonomous vis-à-vis the economic) in their relation to the political class struggle, which is relatively autonomous vis-à-vis the economic class struggle'. 11 Such formulations have been attacked principally upon the simple grounds that they construct an externalising 10 This was the task set by Picciotto 1978, p. 30. 11 Poulantzas 1975, p. 257 . See also Jessop 1990, pp. 85-94. dichotomy between the political (the capitalist state) and the economic (accumulation) which allows for the relative autonomy of the capitalist state to be posited, but which fails to grasp the internal dialectical inter-relations of political economy in doing so. For critics of Poulantzas, the separation of the political and economic spheres, and of structure and struggle, amounts to an ahistorical and pluralist theory of the 'state within capitalist society' in which there is no analysis of the development of capitalist society, of the changing forms of state-society relations and of the state itself. Because there is no systematic analysis of the relation between the capitalist state and its basis, capitalist exploitation of the working class in the process of accumulation, so too there is no analysis of the constraints and limitations which the nature of capitalist accumulation imposes upon state action. Further, his failure correctly to problematise the nature of the separation of the economic and the political leads to his identification of the economic with production relations, and … to a continual tendency to identify class struggle with the realm of the political.
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This 'pluralist conception of social conflict, as conflict between distributively defined social groups organised into pressure groups and political parties which seek to achieve their ends by organising state power as their objective, operating on a given technically determined economic foundation, is the theory which Poulantzas offers as a Marxist theory of class'. 13 And it is this pluralist conception which open Marxists have located as being central to all associated structuralist-functionalist approaches to political economy, including Jessop's strategic-relational and, more recently, neoGramscian approaches. For open Marxists, the implications of this logic are not simply analytical, but also political since they tend towards advocating reformism through the recapturing of political institutions, rather than the emancipation of the revolutionary subject.
At the heart of Taylor's critical reading of the new materialism is an objection to way in which Cammack reproduces this logic. In the latter's piece in Historical Materialism, he explicitly makes a case for … thinking about relative autonomy in a genuinely global capitalist system, and [he proposes] that in such a system relative autonomy should be thought about at both national and global levels. The assumption behind this is straightforward -that where capitalist enterprises compete globally, and where the terrain of the 'global capitalist economy' is shared between a multitude of competing politically independent states, the contradictions generated by the development of capitalism will demand management across the world market as a whole by authoritative institutions with autonomy from both particular capitalist interests and from particular capitalist states.
14 12 Picciotto 1978, p. 7. See, also, Holloway and Picciotto 1991, p. 109 . 13 Clarke 1977 , p. 15. 14 Cammack 2003 In Bonefeld 1995. 17 In fairness to Cammack, the concept of relative autonomy is conspicuous only by its absence in the remainder of his publications since his new materialism was first proposed (Cammack 1999) . And, within his other writing since the 1999 article, there is evidence of a rejection of any tendency to attribute rationality and functionality to international organisations. The original proposal for a new materialism, for example, is couched in terms of offering a genuinely critical alternative to Robert Cox's 'new multilateralism' (Cox 1997) . This anti-functionalism is also apparent in a later article by Cammack which argues that country ownership is fundamental to the World Bank's current project 'because it recognises that it lacks the means to enforce the strategy itself' (Cammack 2003, p. 37 He argues 'that it is important to move beyond Marx's account of commodity fetishism, an account that seeks to isolate the determining ideology of the capitalist mode of production, in order to explore the specificity of ideology in time and space', and that 19 Bieler and Morton 2003, pp. 473-474 . 20 Bonefeld 2004. 21 Bieler and Morton 2003, p. 475. there is no reason why a discursive approach can not be made applicable within the insights of an open Marxist account. Indeed, a consistent Marxist form theory would seem to require a discursive approach for the simple reason that … the form and content of a particular social form of life is usually realised in some way through discursive means. Further, the crisis of a social form partially manifests itself discursively.
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The proposed NMRP accepts Roberts's criticism and will retain a strong discursive focus. In doing so, I do not wish to overstate the importance of ideology, nor to attest to the rationality of neoliberal logic. As Peter Burnham stresses of earlier forms of neoliberal ideology, 'capital does not wait for the articulation of the ideology of monetarism before restructuring. The articulation of ideology is important for the political legitimation of a set of policies that by and large have already been implemented'. 23 However, it would be naive not to emphasise the fact that many forms of neoliberal ideology have a prescriptive dimension which, whilst serving as apologia for past violences inflicted upon societies through neoliberal restructuring, stems from the ability of 'experts' on policy design and reform to think 'critically' about the management of capitalism -albeit only so far as vulgar economy permits.
Hence, the NMRP will focus on key capitalist discourses in much of a similar way as Marx sought to reveal political economy discourses in his own time as wholly bourgeois forms of ideology, prejudice, and apologia.
Global capitalism, ideology and international organisations
Having summarised The proposed NMRP similarly draws attention to particular forms of bourgeois thought which serve to mystify the class character of the globalisation offensive.
Cammack highlights the retroactive character of neoliberal ideology in the following passage:
As the twenty-first century dawned, a bid was underway to establish the global hegemony of capitalism. The essential elements of a global capitalist system -the authority of capital over labour, the unimpeded operation of capitalist markets for labour, goods, and investment, the receptiveness of governments to the needs of capital, the presence of domestic and global regulatory orders capable of reinforcing the disciplines essential to capitalist reproduction, and the dissemination of ideologies justifying capitalism and dismissing alternatives -were in place for the first time … Advocates of alternative strategies are now faced with a new and powerful doctrine for capitalist development, supported and allegedly vindicated by world-historical changes in recent decades and the global shifts in power and authority they reflect … The presentation of this new orthodoxy in seemingly authoritative texts is part of a concerted process of re-establishing the authority of the 38 However, in recent years -and precisely because of the limits to the Bank-endorsed reforms -the orthodoxy has been rethought so as to encompass a partial self-critique which nonetheless allows for the legitimation of political campaigns seeking to 'operationalise' -to use Bank terminology -further rounds of restructuring reforms in the South. 44 Today, the vulgar economists' prescription for state managers are couched within a discourse of promoting competitiveness -a thoroughly fetishising ideology which presents exploitative capitalist social relations in a 'free' market context in wholly benign terms. As I explain later, such discourses are strikingly explicit at times in their orientation towards strategising class practice and legitimating the offensive against labour.
International organisations and national states
As with Cammack's original new materialism, the NMRP accords strategic importance to international organisations in terms of their practical and ideological role in the globalisation offensive. 45 Burnham 2001, pp. 108-9 , for example, writes that it 'should be no surprise that a global system resting on an antagonistic social relationship will be subject to dynamic change as both state and market actors seek to remove what they perceive to be "blockages" in the flow of capital … For the open Marxist tradition, ''globalisation" simply represents a deepening of the existing circuits and a broadening of the "political" as regulative agencies (both public and private) beyond the national state are drawn into the complex process of "managing" the rotation of capital'. 54 Holloway and Picciotto 1991, p. 115, emphasis added. 55 Barker 1991. concept of relative autonomy, he does, I feel, deserve credit for revealing a coherent (albeit vulgar) relative autonomy logic at the heart of World Bank ideology. The task of the NMRP is therefore firstly to engage in immanent critique, to expose the true character of key discourses and initiatives like the CDF as class practice; and then to trace concretely how the moment of unity in the unity-in-separation of 'capital' and 'state' reasserts itself through the failure of such class practice to subordinate class struggle expressed through forms of crisis.
Having set out the foundational claims of a NMRP, the remainder of this paper establishes some preliminary lines of inquiry into the current activities of international regulative agencies such as the World Bank. Evidence of the retroactive and strategic properties of neoliberal ideology is rife within World Bank literature. It is demonstrably clear that the internal coherence of the Bank's reform discourses often hinges on a specific relative autonomy logic; a logic which is carried through into the heart of key operational reforms -principally, the CDF. The World Bank (along with the IMF) has formulated the CDF in accordance with a self-identified role as an impartial managerial body best placed within the 'development community' to provide financial and non-financial value-added ('knowledge') assistance to states across the South seeking to embed appropriate 'governance' processes. 56 As one Bank promotional leaflet advertises: 'what we as a development community can do is help countries -by providing financing, yes; but more important, by providing knowledge and lessons learned about the challenges and how to address them.
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Accordingly, a NMRP ought not to assume that relative autonomy on the part of international organisations or national states is either possible or being realised, simply that the Bank's self-articulated project posits such an autonomous role for itself, as well as states, in entirely plausible terms.
Taylor does stress that 'it is important not to take the Bank's self-representation as the pre-eminent global development leader at face value'. The Bank is after all, as Taylor 2004, p. 26 , writes that the CDF 'represents a vision of the extension of social engineering through policy and institutional reforms in order to achieve a projected market utopia in the global South. It builds upon the basis of the neoliberal project to obliterate institutionalised impediments to the discipline of capital, yet acknowledges the need to recompose new institutional forms to facilitate the former'. Compare this with the following in Cammack 2004a, p. 203: the CDF 'is precisely what it what it says it is -a blueprint for a complete set of social and governmental relations and institutions … Presented as a vehicle for incorporating social and structural policies into an agenda previously dominated by macroeconomic policy alone, it is intended as a means of shaping and monitoring social and element of the NMRP therefore synthesises these arguments, and proposes to explore the contradictory manner in which an institution that is irrational in terms of organisation and accountability to shareholders, fractious in terms of differences in the outlook of particular researchers and managers, and has often failed to impact significantly upon important policy debates does not detract from the consistent manner on which it has elaborated a 'recipe for establishing capitalism on a global scale' in its flagship publications. 59 This recipe is embodied in the form of the CDF, which while presented as the culmination of decades of objective developmental learning, remains fundamentally neoliberal insofar as it is 'centrally concerned with We have a framework to deal with poverty reduction and global environmental challenges. What we do not have is a world executive committee that has global legitimacy, representing the interests of the vast majority, dealing with longer-term strategic issues. Such a world body would have three main tasks: to think seriously about these international issues, to monitor what happens, and to crack the whip when progress is not forthcoming and selfish national or parochial interests threaten to delay progress for the common good.
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Here we have an open plea for some form of relatively autonomous world government. To reiterate then: the task of the NMRP is to reveal the true character of structural policies so that they reinforce and extend macroeconomic discipline, and subordinating them to imperatives of capitalist accumulation'. 59 Cammack, 2002a , p. 178. 60 Gough 2002 Bourguignon and Wolfensohn 2004, p. 32. such a plea as ideology, while tracing the contradictions of international regulative projects such as the CDF as they unfold.
Competitiveness and the recomposition of developing states
It is increasingly clear within World Bank discourses that relatively autonomous international agencies and national institutions are desirable for a reason: they are best suited to promote competitiveness. 62 And competitiveness -attributable to capitalists and workers alike -is desirable as it is the driving force behind economic growth and development. 63 An emerging orthodoxy within development policy circles now contends that only through proactive government involvement in transforming domestic institutions, regulatory frameworks, and discouraging culturally embedded practices deemed non-conducive to the efficient functioning of the market (rent-seeking and graft, for instance) will a suitably competitive environment for both producers and workers ('human capital') be created. This explains why, within key reform discourses, 'deeper' interventionism and 'good governance' -underpinned by a commitment to the promotion of competitivenessare considered preconditions for stable, sustained, and poverty-reducing growth.
The preoccupation with competitiveness at the inter-firm level is reflected in the World Development Report 2005, hailed by one high-profile commentator as 'the most important the Bank has ever produced' since 'it is about how to make market economies work'. 64 The report states that 'a good investment climate encourages firms to invest by removing unjustified costs, risks, and barriers to competition'.
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What is required, therefore, is 'an environment that fosters the competitive processes that Joseph Schumpeter called "creative destruction" -an environment in which firms have opportunities and incentives to test their ideas, strive for success, and prosper or fail '. 66 And in the World Development Report 2006, the square is circled by 62 According to the World Economic Forum 2005, p. xiii, competitiveness is defined as 'the collection of factors, policies and institutions which determine the level of productivity of a country and that, therefore, determine the level of prosperity that can be attained by an economy '. 63 This is the central thrust of an ideology of competitiveness which has been propagated through World Bank literatures and policy documents, representing the culminating of, what Cammack 2004a terms, the 'Wolfensohn-Stiglitz project' after its principal proponents. Taylor accuses Cammack of confusing 'competitiveness (the struggle between individual capitals) with profitability (based on the extraction of surplus-value from labour-in-general by capitalin-general)'. However, it would appear that Taylor actually confuses 'competitiveness' with 'competition'. The tensions Cammack alludes to in his 2003 piece are no different than those highlighted in Bonefeld, Brown and Burnham 1995, p. 29 focusing upon the need for reforms across the developing world aimed at removing inequalities of access and opportunity and empowering the poor to compete and successfully deploy their income generating labour power:
Interventions that build greater human capacities for those with the most limited opportunities (generally the poor) will prepare them to be more economically productive and politically effective … And promoting fairness in markets is all about improvements in the quality of institutions that support and complement markets in ways that broaden access and ensure equitable rules … A good investment climate is about real economic opportunities. Equity is about levelling the playing field so that opportunities are available on the basis of talent and efforts, rather than on the basis of gender, race, family background, or other predetermined circumstances. Discipline forces old enterprises to release assets and labour, which are then potentially available to restructured and new enterprises … The social safety net then needs to be strengthened to ensure that labour shed by contracting enterprises and other losers from reform do not fall into poverty, while not eroding these workers' incentives to find employment in new enterprises. incentives to absorb labour and assets rendered inexpensive by the downsizing and to invest in expansion.
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The transition report also contains a 'stylised model' which explicitly sets out the blueprint for the de-composition of labour in these territories. This is to be accomplished by a relatively autonomous and insulated state pressing on with the offensive against labour and completing depoliticising institutional reforms to the fullest extent possible.
[ figure about here] The model exhibits that, to date (R 1 ), the extent of neoliberalisation after the collapse of the command economy remains limited. It is a legacy of centrally planned development that 'oligarchs' remain in an entrenched position with near monopoly over capital accumulation, and that 'distortions' exist as labour market rigidities persist. According to the Report, such distortions have led to the poor economic performance of these economies since the market transition. This demands a renewed commitment to extended reform (R 2 ) on the part of state managers. The recommodification of public sector workers must be maximised so as to ensure they are exposed to competition in the open labour market, whilst also ensuring an effective market environment for capitalist entrepreneurs who will likewise fly or fall according to their ability to compete.
From the perspective of a NMRP, these reports are indicative of ideology at work: one that apologetically presents earlier offensives against labour as necessary but insufficient; which prescribes a second phase of reforms aimed at dismantling all institutionalised forms of socialisation and cultural practices that prevent the fullest possible command of money over labour; which posits a proactive and relatively autonomous state as essential if competitiveness -between capitalists and workers alike -is to be engineered; and which distorts the class content of the project so that competitiveness, leading to optimal 'total factor productivity', becomes the flip-side of pro-poor, poverty-eradicating growth. This implies a 'complete' de-socialisation of national economies, and a removal of the institutional impediments that stand in the way of money's fullest capability of commanding labour and expanding the productive capabilities of national economies. From a vulgar economy perspective such discourses appear remarkably progressive, even radical. With institutions suitably reformed and potential opposition abated, these economies will be made up 
Conclusion
From a Marxist perspective, if ideology is both retroactive and prescriptive then it has to be politically significant. It serves to mystify and distort actual contradictions as they reveal themselves and to insidiously disseminate a class response to those contradictions. Whether this is a product of rationality and functionality, or simply a product of vulgar logic, the political implications ought to be taken seriously by
Marxists. This is even more important once it becomes apparent that such forms of ideology are becoming orthodox; when they are not particular to a specific institution's ideational output but, rather, characterise the ideational and policyrelated activities of a range of international regulative agencies involved in various ways with state projects across the entire world market. Cammack's work should be commended for drawing attention to evidence that the ideology of competitiveness is becoming such orthodoxy.
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The rationale for this paper is therefore straightforward. I have sought to propose a NMRP which draws upon Cammack's original proposal for a new materialism, but which proceeds from an approach to critique that is -like Taylor's interventioncritical of the structuralism-functionalism contained in the former. By means of a critical synthesis between open Marxism and the new materialism, the proposed NMRP advances a critical theory which views globalisation as a major capital offence; which acknowledges the mediating influence of neoliberal discourses, doctrines and orthodoxies in the course of capital's unfolding crisis; and which takes as its main focus of critique the activities of key international regulative agencies. As regards the World Bank, in particular, the article finds credence in Cammack's portrait of a globally significant institution which, in the face of the profound internal and wider contextual contradictions Taylor ably highlights, has nonetheless been responsible for the sustained and ostensibly coherent dissemination of a retroactive ideology which distorts and recasts capital's dilemma and neoliberalism's 'solution' in wholly benign terms. I have argued, in a necessarily cursory manner, that a NMRP ought to proceed from the recognition of the centrality of relatively autonomous states within reform discourses that increasingly comply with an orthodoxy of competitiveness. In order to further develop the NMRP, it will be necessary to extend this critique to encompass the specific relations between such regulative agencies and those very national states being urged to promote competitiveness. Of course, it is possible that such demands will fall upon deaf ears as some state managers wage 71 Marx 1976, p. 280 .
Figure: Winners and Losers from Reform
Note: R 0 = no reforms; R 1 = point at which income gains of oligarchs and insiders are maximized; R 2 = level of reforms that allows the winners of reforms beyond R 1 (new entrants) to compensate for or exercise enough political pressure to neutralize the resistance of oligarchs, insiders, and state sector workers (Source: World Bank 2002, p. 93).
